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INTRODUCTION	That	the	Constitution	contemplates	some	meaningful	role	for	federal	courts	in	foreign	affairs	is	clear	from	the	text	of	Article	III,	which	 confers	 jurisdiction	over	not	only	 cases	 arising	under	 the	Constitution	and	federal	statutes,	but	also	“Cases	.	.	.	arising	under	.	.	.	Treaties	made”	under	the	authority	of	the	United	States,	“Cases	affecting	Ambassadors,	other	public	Ministers	and	Consuls,”	“Cases	
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1236	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	of	 admiralty	 and	 maritime	 Jurisdiction,”	 and	 party-based	jurisdiction	over	controversies	 involving,	among	others,	 “foreign	States,	Citizens,	or	Subjects.”1	But	the	constitutional	text	stops	well	short	of	fully	specifying	the	precise	role	that	federal	courts	should	play	 in	 the	 conduct	 of	 the	 nation’s	 foreign	 affairs	 or	 the	 precise	relationship	 between	 the	 judiciary’s	 powers	 and	 those	 of	 the	Legislative	and	Executive	Departments.	In	this	respect,	the	textual	specification	 of	 the	 judiciary’s	 powers	 over	 foreign	 affairs,	 like	those	 describing	 the	 powers	 of	 the	 President	 and	 Congress,	conform	to	Professor	Edward	Corwin’s	famous	description	of	the	Constitution	 as	 “an	 invitation	 to	 struggle	 for	 the	 privilege	 of	directing	American	foreign	policy.”2		But	 as	 Professor	 Martin	 Flaherty	 demonstrates	 in	 his	impressive	 new	 book, 3 	the	 modern	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 shown	relatively	little	interest	in	asserting	itself	in	this	struggle.	Instead,	the	 Court	 has	 taken	 a	 variety	 of	 steps	 that	 have	 limited	 its	involvement	 in	 international	affairs	and	 largely	acquiesced	 in	an	expansive	 conception	 of	 presidential	 power	 that	 limits	 the	circumstances	 in	 which	 it	 must	 step	 in	 to	 police	 the	 boundary	separating	 presidential	 power	 from	 congressional	 power. 4	Drawing	 heavily	 on	 historical,	 structural,	 and	 functional	arguments,	Flaherty	critiques	this	practice	and	urges	the	Court	to	adopt	a	more	assertive	role	in	foreign	relations	that	he	contends	is	more	consistent	with	its	Founding-era	practices.5	There	 is	 a	 great	 deal	 to	 admire	 in	 Professor	 Flaherty’s	carefully	 researched	 volume,	 including	 the	 impressive	 historical	contextualization	of	a	broad	swath	of	doctrines	touching	on	foreign	affairs.	As	Professor	Flaherty	shows,	courts	 in	 the	early	republic	played	a	far	more	prominent	and	assertive	role	in	foreign	affairs	controversies	 than	does	 the	modern	 judiciary	 actively	 enforcing	international	 law	 and	 treaty	 commitments	 and	 enforcing	meaningful	limits	distinguishing	Congress’s	foreign	affairs	powers	
 1.	 U.S.	CONST.	art.	III,	§	2.	2.	 EDWARD	S.	CORWIN,	THE	PRESIDENT:	OFFICE	AND	POWERS	1787-1957	171	(1957).	3 .	 MARTIN	 S.	 FLAHERTY,	 RESTORING	 THE	 GLOBAL	 JUDICIARY:	 WHY	 THE	 SUPREME	 COURT	SHOULD	RULE	IN	U.S.	FOREIGN	AFFAIRS	(2019).	4.	 Id.	at	14-17.	5.	 Id.	at	17-19.	
 
2020]	 "JUDICIAL	ROLE"	&	JUDICIAL	DUTY	 1237	from	those	of	the	President.6	If	judged	simply	by	reference	to	the	practical	 significance	 of	 the	 judiciary’s	 role	 in	 foreign	 affairs	throughout	 the	 eighteenth,	 nineteenth,	 and	 early	 twentieth	centuries,	there	seems	little	basis	for	doubting	that	modern	cases	suggest	 a	 substantially	 diminished	 role	 for	 the	 judiciary	 in	 this	particular	category	of	legal	questions.7	But	 this	 focus	 on	 practical	 significance	 is	 not	 the	 only	perspective	from	which	the	judiciary’s	proper	“role”	in	the	conduct	of	US	foreign	affairs	might	plausibly	be	assessed.	Part	I	of	this	Essay	sketches	an	alternative	way	of	 thinking	about	 judicial	“role”	that	connects	 the	 interpretive	 power	 and	 authority	 of	 the	 Article	 III	federal	 courts	 to	 those	 courts’	 more	 fundamental	 duty	 to	accurately	apply	the	underlying	substantive	law	to	the	particular	cases	and	controversies	that	are	brought	within	their	jurisdiction.	When	 assessed	 from	 this	 perspective,	 straightforward	comparisons	of	 judicial	“role”	at	different	points	 in	US	history	of	the	 type	 that	 feature	 prominently	 in	 Professor	 Flaherty’s	 book	become	somewhat	more	complicated.	Because	the	content	of	the	underlying	substantive	rules	of	law	may	have	changed	over	time,	it	is	possible	that	the	judiciary’s	proper	functional	“role”	in	foreign	affairs	controversies	might	be	significantly	 less	prominent	 today	than	it	had	been	in	the	past	even	if	the	courts	themselves	faithfully	adhere	 to	a	consistent	understanding	of	 their	constitutional	 role	and	duty.	Part	II	of	the	Essay	briefly	considers	three	possible	instances	of	legal	change	that	might	plausibly	have	influenced	the	judiciary’s	“role”	in	foreign	affairs	matters	in	the	manner	Part	I	suggests.	In	particular,	Part	II	focuses	upon:	(1.)	the	practical	demise	of	prize	jurisdiction	as	a	meaningful	subject	of	international	law	in	the	late	nineteenth	 and	 early	 twentieth	 centuries,	 (2.)	 the	United	 States’	enhanced	engagement	with	multilateral	human	rights	treaties	and	the	corresponding	increase	in	treaty	reservations	during	the	mid-twentieth	 century,	 and	 (3.)	 the	 shift	 in	 the	 conceptual	underpinnings	 of	 the	 statutory	 presumption	 against	extraterritoriality	 that	 occurred	 between	 the	 middle	 and	 later	decades	of	the	twentieth	century.	
 6.	 Id.	at	13-14.	7.	 Cf.	 id.	 at	 174-75	 (suggesting	 that	modern	 jurisprudence	 has	 deviated	 from	 the	framers’	conception	of	the	separation	of	powers,	which	“contemplate[d]	an	important	role	for	the	judiciary	in	foreign	as	in	domestic	affairs”).	
1238	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	Part	III	flags	three	important	caveats	that	limit	and	qualify	the	scope	and	strength	of	the	claims	being	made	in	this	Essay.	 	First,		the	 claims	 asserted	 in	 this	 essay	 are	 conceptual,	 rather	 than	empirical	in	nature	and	thus	should	not	be	understood	as	staking	out	 any	 strong	 claims	 about	 the	 content	 of	 existing	 law	 or	 the	relationship	between	existing	law	and	the	law	that	predominated	during	any	particular	earlier	period.	 	 Second,	 it	may	be	 the	case	that	 constitutional	 questions	 reflect	 additional	 interpretive	challenges	in	assessing	the	judiciary’s	proper	“role”	and	that	such	distinctive	 challenges	 are	not	 fully	 accounted	 for	by	 the	present	observations.	 	 Finally,	 the	 conception	 of	 “judicial	 role”	 that	provides	 the	 central	 framing	 device	 for	 this	 Essay	 may	 not	 be	appropriate	for	non-judicial	actors	in	our	constitutional	system.	
I.	JUDICIAL	POWER	AND	JUDICIAL	DUTY	Any	 discussion	 of	 the	 judiciary’s	 proper	 “role”	 in	 foreign	affairs	must	start	with	a	clear	understanding	of	the	judiciary’s	role	in	the	broader	constitutional	framework	and	the	nature	of	judicial	power	more	generally.	The	foundational—or	at	least	most	widely	quoted—articulation	 of	 the	 judiciary’s	 constitutional	 role	 is,	 of	course,	found	in	Marbury	v.	Madison,	and	more	specifically,	Chief	Justice	Marshall’s	famous	exhortation	that	“[i]t	is	emphatically	the	province	and	duty	of	the	Judicial	Department	to	say	what	the	law	is.”8 	Less	 often	 quoted	 are	 the	 two	 sentences	 that	 immediately	follow	Marshall’s	famous	aphorism:	“Those	who	apply	the	rule	to	particular	 cases	 must,	 of	 necessity,	 expound	 and	 interpret	 that	rule.	If	two	laws	conflict	with	each	other,	the	Courts	must	decide	on	 the	 operation	 of	 each.” 9 	In	 other	 words,	 the	 foundation	 of	judicial	 power—including	 the	 much	 vaunted	 power	 of	 “judicial	review”—is	 characterized	as	derivative	of,	 and	 contingent	upon,	the	judiciary’s	more	fundamental	duty	to	apply	existing	law	to	the	facts	 of	 the	 particular	 cases	 and	 controversies	 that	 are	 brought	within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	federal	courts.10	
 8.	 Marbury	v.	Madison,	5	U.S.	(1	Cranch)	137,	177	(1803).	9.	 Id.	10.	 See	id.	at	178	(“[I]f	a	law	be	in	opposition	to	the	Constitution	…	so	that	the	Court	must	 either	 decide	 that	 case	 conformably	 to	 the	 law,	 disregarding	 the	 Constitution,	 or	conformably	to	the	Constitution,	disregarding	the	law,	the	Court	must	determine	which	of	these	conflicting	rules	governs	the	case.	This	is	of	the	very	essence	of	judicial	duty.”);	see	
 
2020]	 "JUDICIAL	ROLE"	&	JUDICIAL	DUTY	 1239	At	least	two	important	implications	flow	from	this	particular	understanding	of	the	judiciary’s	proper	role	in	our	constitutional	framework.	First,	identifying	the	link	between	judicial	power	and	judicial	 duty	 suggests	 that	 the	 constitutional	 foundations	 of	 the	judiciary’s	much	celebrated	power	“to	say	what	the	law	is”	may	be	much	less	distinctive	than	is	often	assumed.	If	the	judiciary’s	power	of	 law	 interpretation	 and	 exposition	 is	 simply	 an	 outgrowth	 or	incident	of	its	more	fundamental	constitutional	duty	to	apply	the	law	to	the	cases	legitimately	brought	within	its	jurisdiction,	then	its	power	in	this	regard	may	not	differ	all	that	meaningfully	from	that	of	either	Congress	or	the	Executive	Branch,	each	of	which	must	also	 interpret	 the	 law	to	some	extent	 in	order	to	discharge	their	own	 respective	 constitutional	 duties.11	Roughly	 a	 decade	 before	the	 Marbury	 decision,	 Alexander	 Hamilton	 described	 the	President’s	interpretive	authority	in	remarkably	similar	terms	to	those	Marshall	would	 later	use	 to	 explain	 the	 judiciary’s	power:	“The	President	is	the	constitutional	Executor	of	the	laws	.	.	.	He	who	is	 to	 execute	 the	 laws	 must	 first	 judge	 for	 himself	 of	 their	meaning.”12	
 
also,	e.g.,	United	States	v.	Windsor,	570	U.S.	744,	781	(Scalia,	J.,	dissenting)	(“[D]eclaring	the	compatibility	of	state	or	federal	laws	with	the	Constitution	is	not	only	not	the	‘primary	role’	 of	 this	 Court,	 it	 is	 not	 a	 separate,	 free-standing	 role	 at	 all.	We	 perform	 that	 role	incidentally—by	accident,	as	it	were—when	that	is	necessary	to	resolve	the	dispute	before	us.”).	 For	 an	 extensive	 historical	 examination	 of	 the	 link	 between	 judicial	 power	 and	judicial	duty	in	early	American	political	and	legal	thought,	see	generally	PHILIP	HAMBURGER,	LAW	AND	JUDICIAL	DUTY	(2008).	11.	 See,	e.g.,	Keith	E.	Whittington,	Extrajudicial	Constitutional	 Interpretation:	Three	
Objections	 and	 Responses,	 80	 N.C.	 L.	 REV.	 773,	 781-82	 (2002)	 (observing	 that	 even	proponents	of	judicial	supremacy	do	not	take	the	position	that	the	Supreme	Court	should	be	the	exclusive	interpreter	of	the	Constitution	and	that	“government	officials	routinely,	if	often	implicitly,	render	constitutional	judgments	in	the	absence	of	judicial	deliberation	on	the	issue.”).	12.	 Alexander	Hamilton,	Pacificus	No	1	(June	29,	1793),	in	THE	PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS	DEBATES	OF	1793–1794:	TOWARD	THE	COMPLETION	OF	THE	AMERICAN	FOUNDING	16	(Morton	J.	Frisch,	 ed.	2007).	Hamilton’s	defense	of	presidential	 interpretive	authority	 came	 in	 the	context	 of	 the	 Neutrality	 Crisis	 of	 1793	 and	 President	 Washington’s	 unilateral	proclamation	of	American	neutrality.	See	FLAHERTY,	supra	note	3,	at	67-73	(discussing	the	Neutrality	 Controversy).	Washington’s	 proclamation	 followed	 an	 unsuccessful	 effort	 to	obtain	an	advisory	opinion	 from	the	Supreme	Court	regarding	 the	nature	of	 the	United	States’	treaty	obligations	toward	France,	which	the	Justices	famously	refused	to	provide	establishing	an	important	early	precedent	regarding	the	limited	scope	of	Supreme	Court	review.	Id.	at	71-72.	
 
1240	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	On	this	view	of	the	judicial	power	“to	say	what	the	law	is,”	the	absence	 of	 judicial	 oversight	 of	 certain	 questions	 affecting	 the	other	 two	 Branches’	 authority	 over	 foreign	 affairs	 is	 neither	particularly	 aberrational	 nor	 particularly	 disturbing.	 Rather,	 the	absence	of	judicial	involvement	may	simply	reflect	the	absence	of	a	 substantive	 entitlement	 conferring	 on	 aggrieved	 litigants	 an	entitlement	 to	 judicial	 relief.	 	 Alternatively,	 such	 absence	 may	simply	 reflect	 a	 decision	 by	 the	 affected	 parties	 not	 to	 bring	whatever	claims	they	might	have	before	a	federal	tribunal.13	A	 second	 important	 implication	 of	 linking	 judicial	 role	 to	judicial	duty	is	that	questions	of	“judicial	role”	are	likely	to	hinge	on	 the	 content	 of	 the	 underlying	 substantive	 law	 governing	 the	United	States’	relations	with	foreign	nations	and	the	nature	of	the	particular	 cases	 and	 controversies	 that	 are	 brought	 before	 the	courts.	This	means	that	a	determination	as	to	whether	a	particular	level	of	judicial	involvement	in	US	foreign	affairs	is	unduly	passive	(or	unduly	assertive)	cannot	meaningfully	be	made	without	some	assessment	of	the	content	of	the	governing	legal	rules	that	define	the	rights	and	duties	of	the	parties	who	choose	to	litigate	in	federal	court.	And	because	both	the	content	of	the	governing	law	and	the	nature	of	the	controversies	brought	before	the	courts	may	change	over	 time,	 the	 appropriate	 level	 of	 judicial	 involvement	 may	change	as	well	 for	 reasons	other	 than	a	 refusal	by	 the	 courts	 to	perform	their	assigned	constitutional	role.	This	means,	 among	other	 things,	 that	 simply	 looking	 to	 the	practical	significance	of	judicial	decision-making	to	the	conduct	of	US	foreign	affairs	at	one	point	in	history	(including	the	Founding	era)	may	not	provide	a	reliable	guide	to	how	significant	a	role	the	courts	should	play	in	modern	foreign	affairs	controversies.	Rather,	the	 judiciary’s	proper	“role”	 in	 foreign	affairs	may	have	changed	because	the	content	of	the	relevant	law	and/or	the	nature	of	the	cases	brought	before	 the	 courts	have	 changed	over	 time.	 Such	a	shift	in	background	law	or	in	the	nature	of	cases	brought	within	the	scope	of	the	federal	courts’	jurisdiction	could	plausibly	lead	to	the	judiciary’s	role	being	seen	as	less	practically	significant	today	than	it	may	have	been	in	earlier	periods.	
 13.	 Cf.	Ryan	C.	Williams,	Due	Process,	Class	Action	Opt	Outs,	and	the	Right	Not	to	Sue,	115	 COLUM.	 L.	 REV.	 599,	 621-26	 (2015)	 (noting	 that	 a	 party’s	 legal	 entitlement	 to	 sue	typically	 carries	 with	 it	 a	 corresponding	 entitlement	 to	 choose	 not	 to	 have	 the	 claim	asserted	in	litigation).	
2020]	 "JUDICIAL	ROLE"	&	JUDICIAL	DUTY	 1241	
II.	JUDICIAL	DUTY	AND	CHANGES	IN	GOVERNING	LAW	To	assess	the	precise	contours	of	judicial	duty	with	respect	to	foreign	affairs	in	our	contemporary	environment	would	require	a	carefully	detailed	assessment	of	what	contemporary	law	requires	with	respect	to	each	legal	doctrine	that	might	plausibly	affect	US	relations	 with	 foreign	 nations.	 And	 to	 compare	 the	 judiciary’s	“proper	role”	in	foreign	affairs	under	this	framework	to	its	proper	role	 at	 earlier	 periods	 of	 our	 nation’s	 history	would	 require	 an	equally	 careful	 doctrine-by-doctrine	 assessment	 of	 what	governing	law	required	during	those	earlier	periods.	Such	a	review	is	well	beyond	the	scope	of	the	present	inquiry.		Instead,	this	Part	will	 simply	 highlight	 three	 particularly	 prominent	 examples	 of	legal	change	that	have	occurred	over	the	course	of	our	history	that	have	shaped	the	development	of	 judicial	doctrine,	each	of	which	might	plausibly	be	seen	as	having	limited	the	practical	significance	of	the	judiciary’s	role	in	foreign	affairs.	
A.	Changes	in	International	Law	and	Practice:	The	Example	of	Prize	
Jurisdiction	One	way	in	which	changes	in	background	law	may	affect	the	federal	judiciary’s	proper	role	on	the	world	stage	involves	changes	in	 background	 principles	 of	 international	 law	 or	 patterns	 of	international	practice.	A	prominent	example	of	 this	 type	of	 legal	change	 is	 provided	 by	 the	 demise	 of	 prize	 jurisdiction	 as	 a	meaningful	source	of	adjudication	during	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	 twentieth	 centuries.	 Under	 the	 eighteenth-century	international	 law	 of	 war,	 belligerent	 nations	 possessed	 the	prerogative	 to	 seize	 property	 belonging	 to	 enemy	 nationals	 in	order	to	deprive	the	enemy	of	the	means	of	resistance.14	The	law	of	prize	had	developed	as	a	specialized	branch	of	the	law	of	war	to	formalize	and	regularize	the	legal	rights,	powers,	and	obligations	of	belligerent	nations	and	neutrals	with	respect	to	the	capture	of	seagoing	vessels	and	their	cargo.15	Courts	played	an	integral	role	
 14.	 EMER	DE	VATTEL,	THE	LAW	OF	NATIONS,	bk.	III,	ch.	IX,	§	161	(Belá	Kapossy	&	Richard	Whitmore	eds.,	Liberty	Fund	2008).	15.	 David	 J.	 Bederman,	The	 Feigned	 Demise	 of	 Prize,	 9	 EMORY	 INT’L	 L.	 REV.	 31,	 33	(1995)	 (reviewing	 J.H.W.	 VERZIJL,	W.P.	 HEERE	 &	 J.P.S.	 OFFERHAUS,	 INTERNATIONAL	 LAW	 IN	HISTORICAL	PERSPECTIVE,	VOL.	11,	PART	IX-C:	THE	LAW	OF	MARITIME	PRIZE	(1992))	(“[C]ontrols	
 
1242	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	in	 the	 workability	 of	 this	 system	 because	 a	 judicial	 decree	 was	necessary	 to	 give	 the	 claimants—both	 naval	 crewmen	 and	privateers	 licensed	 by	 the	 belligerent	 state—clear	 legal	 title	 to	captured	property.16	Prize	 law	 hinged	 on	 an	 elaborate	 system	 of	 widely	 shared	international	 law	 principles	 that	 had	 been	 carefully	 honed	 by	courts	 and	 commentators	 over	 the	 course	 of	 centuries. 17	Adherence	 to	 these	principles	by	courts	of	all	 “civilized”	nations	allowed	belligerents	and	neutrals	whose	property	was	caught	up	in	 prize	 proceedings	 to	 attain	 a	measure	 of	 certainty	 regarding	their	rights	and	obligations18	and	minimized	the	potential	for	naval	captures	 to	 create	 or	 exacerbate	 international	 conflict. 19	Conversely,	 the	 failure	of	a	nation	 to	adhere	 to	 the	 international	law	principles	 that	governed	prize	 cases	 could	not	only	unsettle	private	commercial	expectations	but	risked	embroiling	the	nation	in	 international	 conflict—up	 to	 and	 including	 war. 20 	For	 this	reason,	 attempting	 to	 regularize	 the	 administration	 of	 prize	jurisdiction	 in	 state	 courts	was	 an	 early	 focus	 of	 concern	 in	 the	
 on	the	seizure	of	an	adversary’s	ships	and	cargoes-as	well	as	those	of	neutral	powers-have	preoccupied	the	minds	of	masters,	merchants,	and	naval	officers	(along	with	their	lawyers)	since	the	early	Middle	Ages.”).	16.	 See,	e.g.,	3	JOSEPH	STORY,	COMMENTARIES	ON	THE	CONSTITUTION	OF	THE	UNITED	STATES	§	1662	(1833)	(describing	 the	establishment	and	administration	of	prize	courts	as	“not	only	 a	 natural,	 but	 a	 necessary	 appendage	 to	 the	 power	 of	 war,	 and	 negotiation	 with	foreign	nations.”).	17.	 Bederman,	supra	note	15,	at	33.	On	the	background	and	development	of	the	legal	principles	 governing	 prize	 cases,	 see	 generally	 1	 PHILIP	 C.	 JESSUP	 &	 FRANCIS	 DEAK,	NEUTRALITY:	ITS	HISTORY,	ECONOMICS,	AND	LAW	(1935).	18.	 See,	e.g.,	David	A.	Faber,	Justice	Bushrod	Washington	and	the	Age	of	Discovery	in	
American	 Law,	 102	 W.	 VA.	 L.	 REV.	 735,	 782	 (2000)	 (“The	 benefits	 of	 [prize	 law]	 to	commerce	…	are	obvious.	Merchants	have	one	set	of	rules	and	get	one	opportunity	in	prize	cases;	they	do	not	have	to	deal	with	inconsistent	rules	of	law	and	decisions	by	competing	courts.	Once	a	prize	court	acts,	the	decision	is	final	for	all.”).	19.	 See	3	STORY,	supra	note	16	(warning	that,	in	the	absence	of	a	uniform	system	of	prize	jurisdiction	“the	peace	of	the	whole	nation	might	be	put	at	hazard	at	any	time	by”	the	actions	of	a	single	state	court	because	the	federal	government	“could	neither	restore	upon	an	illegal	capture;	nor	in	many	cases	afford	any	adequate	redress	for	the	wrong;	nor	punish	the	aggressor.”);	cf.	Ryan	C.	Williams,	The	“Guarantee”	Clause,	132	HARV.	L.	REV.	602,	616	(2018)	(observing	that	“[t]he	eighteenth-century	law	of	nations	permitted	one	nation	who	believed	 itself	 wronged	 by	 another’s	 violation	 of	 its	 international	 obligations	 to	 wage	offensive	war,	both	to	obtain	redress	for	its	injuries	and	to	punish	the	offender”).	20.	 See,	e.g.,	David	M.	Golove	&	Daniel	 J.	Hulsebosch,	A	Civilized	Nation:	The	Early	
American	Constitution,	the	Law	of	Nations,	and	the	Pursuit	of	International	Recognition,	85	N.Y.U.	L.	REV.	932,	1003-04	(2010).	
 
2020]	 "JUDICIAL	ROLE"	&	JUDICIAL	DUTY	 1243	Revolutionary-era	 Confederation	 Congress. 21 	And	 concern	 over	administration	of	prize	cases	provided	a	significant	impetus	for	the	Philadelphia	 Convention’s	 decision	 to	 confer	 jurisdiction	 over	admiralty	and	maritime	cases	on	the	Article	III	judiciary.22	During	the	Founding	era	and	for	close	to	a	century	thereafter,	prize	jurisdiction	constituted	one	of	the	most	significant	sources	of	litigation	 implicating	 US	 foreign	 affairs. 23 	Some	 of	 the	 most	significant	early	foreign	affairs	precedents	from	the	first	century	of	our	nation’s	existence,	including	Murray	v.	The	Schooner	Charming	
Betsy,24	The	Schooner	Exchange	v.	McFaddon,25	and,	of	course,	The	
“Prize	 Cases,” 26 	arose	 out	 of	 this	 branch	 of	 the	 federal	 courts’	jurisdiction.	Because	prize	law	was	an	integral	component	of	the	international	law	of	war,	and	because	the	law	of	nations	typically	supplied	the	rule	of	decision	governing	the	parties’	legal	rights	in	prize	 cases, 27 	the	 federal	 courts’	 prize	 jurisdiction	 gave	 those	
 21.	 Wythe	 Holt,	 “To	 Establish	 Justice”:	 Politics,	 the	 Judiciary	 Act	 of	 1789,	 and	 the	
Invention	of	 the	Federal	Courts,	1989	DUKE	L.J.	1421,	1427-30	(discussing	controversies	surrounding	state	administration	of	prize	proceedings	in	the	Early	Republic).	22.	 See,	e.g.,	Golove	&	Hulsebosch,	supra	note	20,	at	1004	(“[T]he	grant	of	admiralty	jurisdiction	 to	 the	 federal	 courts—with	 their	 constitutionally	guaranteed	 independence	from	the	legislative	and	executive	branches—was	an	important	signal	to	European	powers	of	the	willingness	and	capacity	of	the	new	nation	to	uphold	its	legal	obligations.”);	William	R.	Casto,	The	Origins	of	Federal	Admiralty	Jurisdiction	in	an	Age	of	Privateers,	Smugglers,	
and	Pirates,	37	AM.	J.	LEGAL	HIST.	117,	118	(1993)	(identifying	prize	cases,	along	with	cases	involving	 enforcement	 of	 U.S.	 revenue	 laws	 and	 criminal	 prosecutions	 arising	 out	 of	offenses	 on	 the	 high	 seas	 as	 among	 the	 most	 significant	 factors	 driving	 the	 Framers’	decision	to	confer	admiralty	jurisdiction	on	the	federal	courts).	23.	 Golove	&	Hulsebosch,	supra	note	20,	at	1003	(identifying	prize	cases	as	“among	the	 most	 numerous	 and	 important	 types	 of	 cases	 raising	 questions	 under	 the	 law	 of	nations”	 in	 the	 early	 Republic);	 Ariel	 N.	 Lavinbuk,	 Note,	 Rethinking	 Early	 Judicial	
Involvement	in	Foreign	Affairs:	An	Empirical	Study	of	the	Supreme	Court’s	Docket,	114	YALE	L.J.	855,	882-83	(2005).	24 .	 Murray	 v.	 The	 Schooner	 Charming	 Betsy,	 6	 U.S.	 (2	 Cranch)	 64,	 118	 (1804)	(articulating	a	rule	of	statutory	construction	providing	that	“an	act	of	Congress	ought	never	to	be	construed	to	violate	the	law	of	nations	if	any	other	possible	construction	remains.”).	25.	 The	 Schooner	 Exchange	 v.	McFaddon,	 11	 U.S.	 (7	 Cranch)	 116,	 134-35	 (1812)	(holding	 the	 ships	 of	 national	 sovereigns	 exempt	 from	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 federal	courts).	26.	 The	Prize	Cases,	67	U.S.	(2	Black)	635,	668-71	(1862)	(concluding	that	President	Lincoln	 possessed	 the	 constitutional	 authority	 to	 order	 a	 blockade	 of	 the	 rebellious	Southern	states	at	the	outbreak	of	the	U.S.	Civil	War	without	obtaining	prior	Congressional	authorization).	27.	 See	Golove	&	Hulsebosch,	supra	note	20,	at	1001-02.	
 
1244	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	courts	a	particularly	prominent	voice	in	the	young	nation’s	conduct	of	foreign	affairs.	In	 the	mid-nineteenth	 century,	 however,	 the	 significance	 of	prize	cases	in	the	framework	of	international	law	began	to	recede.	The	1856	Paris	Declaration	Respecting	Maritime	Law	reflected	a	commitment	by	most	of	the	great	powers	of	Europe	to	abandon	the	practice	of	privateering,	thereby	eliminating	a	significant	portion	of	the	economic	incentive	that	had	motivated	prize	cases	in	earlier	years.28	And	though	the	United	States	was	initially	a	holdout	from	the	Paris	Declaration,	the	political	branches	eventually	acquiesced	in	the	international	trend	away	from	privateering	as	a	permissible	method	of	warfare.29	This	 shift	 in	 international	 practice	 left	 open	 a	 possible	continuing	 role	 for	 prize	 law	 as	 a	 mechanism	 for	 adjudicating	captures	 by	 naval	 officers	 and	 crew. 30 	And	 federal	 courts	continued	to	hand	down	a	few	significant	prize	decisions	through	the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century. 31 	Indeed,	 prize	 cases	remain	 a	 formal	 subject	 of	 federal	 district	 courts’	 statutorily	conferred	jurisdiction	to	this	day.32	But	legal	reforms	of	the	early	twentieth	 century	 removed	 most	 of	 the	 persisting	 financial	incentives	 for	 naval	 personnel	 to	 initiate	 prize	proceedings,	 and	prize	cases	essentially	vanished	as	a	meaningful	component	of	the	
 28.	 Bederman,	supra	note	15,	at	43.	29.	 See	Proclamation	No.	8,		30	Stat.	1770,	1771	(Apr.	26,	1898)	(“[T]he	policy	of	this	Government	 will	 be	 not	 to	 resort	 to	 privateering,	 but	 to	 adhere	 to	 the	 rules	 of	 the	Declaration	of	Paris”);	see	also	Bederman,	supra	note	15,	at	43	n.54	(discussing	possible	reasons	for	the	United	States’	initial	reluctance	to	join	in	the	Paris	Declaration).	30.	 Bederman,	supra	note	15,	at	43-44	(acknowledging	the	continued	ability	of	naval	personnel	to	bring	prize	actions).	31.	 Perhaps	most	 famous	was	the	United	States	Supreme	Court’s	1900	decision	 in	
The	Paquete	Habana,	175	U.S.	677	(1900)—a	prize	decision	growing	out	of	the	capture	of	Spanish	 fishing	 vessels	 during	 the	 Spanish-American	 War.	 The	 decision	 acquired	 an	outsized	degree	of	retrospective	significance	due	to	later	citations	of	Justice	Horace	Gray’s	declaration	that	“[i]nternational	law	is	part	of	our	law[.]”	Id.	at	700.	See	also,	e.g.,	FLAHERTY,	
supra	note	3,	at	88-89	(discussing	the	influence	of	The	Paquete	Habana);	Bederman,	supra	note	15,	at	66-67	(same).	32.	 28	U.S.C.	§	1333(2)	(2018)	(conferring	on	federal	district	courts	jurisdiction	over	“[a]ny	prize	brought	into	the	United	States	and	all	proceedings	for	the	condemnation	of	property	taken	as	prize.”).	
 
2020]	 "JUDICIAL	ROLE"	&	JUDICIAL	DUTY	 1245	judiciary’s	 caseload	 by	 the	 middle	 portion	 of	 the	 twentieth	century.33	Prize	law’s	demise	has	obvious	implications	for	assessing	the	judiciary’s	 proper	 “role”	 on	 the	 international	 stage	 under	 a	conception	 of	 judicial	 role	 that	 prioritizes	 the	 judicial	 duty	 to	decide	actual	cases	between	adverse	 litigants.	For	one	 thing,	 the	collapse	of	prize	 jurisdiction	eliminated	a	 significant	 category	of	litigants	who,	 under	 virtually	 any	 plausible	 doctrinal	 test,	 could	establish	the	existence	of	a	genuine	“case	or	controversy”	sufficient	to	confer	standing	on	the	federal	courts.34	And	because	prize	law	
required	 the	 judiciary	 to	 make	 determinations	 regarding	 the	nation’s	rights	and	responsibilities	regarding	the	conduct	of	war	as	a	necessary	incident	of	deciding	such	cases,35	this	particular	head	of	jurisdiction	allowed—indeed,	required—the	judiciary	to	play	a	significant	 role	 in	 the	 determination	 of	 foreign	 affairs	controversies.	But	with	prize	jurisdiction’s	collapse,	the	courts	may	have	fewer	occasions	to	opine	on	such	matters	because	no	litigant	possesses	the	type	of	standing	necessary	to	confer	jurisdiction	on	the	federal	courts.36	The	disappearance	of	prize	 law	as	a	meaningful	category	of	Article	III	adjudication	has	also	affected	the	substance	of	the	law	that	the	federal	courts	are	called	upon	to	apply.	Prize	law	reflected	a	system	of	carefully	refined	and	reasonably	clear	legal	rules	that	
 33.	 See	Bederman,	supra	note	15,	at	38	(“[S]ince	1948,	there	was	not	a	single	true	prize	 decision	 reported	 in	 the	 United	 States.”);	 see	 also	 Nicholas	 Parrillo,	 The	 De-
Privatization	 of	 American	 Warfare:	 How	 the	 U.S.	 Government	 Used,	 Regulated,	 and	
Ultimately	Abandoned	Privateering	in	the	Nineteenth	Century,	19	YALE	J.L.	&	HUMAN.	1,	90-95	(2007)	(discussing	late	nineteenth	century	legislative	reforms	that	eliminated	financial	incentives	for	naval	personnel	to	bring	prize	actions).	34.	 Cf.	 Summers	v.	Earth	 Island	 Institute,	555	U.S.	488,	493	 (2009)	 (articulating	a	doctrinal	test	for	standing	that	requires	the	showing	of	an	actual	injury	that	is	concrete	and	 particularized,	 fairly	 traceable	 to	 the	 defendant’s	 action,	 and	 redressable	 by	 the	courts).	35.	 See,	e.g.,	The	Prize	Cases,	67	U.S.	(2	Black)	635,	667-71	(1862)	(considering	the	lawfulness	 of	 a	 federal	 blockade	 initiated	 without	 a	 formal	 declaration	 of	 war	 by	Congress);	 The	 Nereide,	 13	 U.S.	 (9	 Cranch)	 388,	 425-27	 (1815)	 (considering	 whether	neutral	property	carried	on	belligerent	ships	could	lawfully	be	claimed	as	prize).	36.	 See,	e.g.,	Holtzman	v.	Schlesinger,	484	F.2d	1307	(2d	Cir.	1973)	(concluding	that	member	 of	 Congress	 lacked	 standing	 to	 challenge	 President’s	 conduct	 of	 military	operations	 allegedly	 unauthorized	 by	 Congress);	 Smith	 v.	 Obama,	 217	 F.	 Supp.	 3d	 283	(D.D.C.	 2016)	 (rejecting	 service	 member’s	 claim	 of	 standing	 to	 challenge	 President’s	deployment	of	military	forces).	
 
1246	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	had	been	developed	by	jurists	and	commentators	over	the	course	of	centuries.37	There	was	no	question	as	to	the	power	and	duty	of	federal	courts	to	look	to	international	law	as	the	governing	rule	of	decision	in	this	category	of	cases	because	the	universal	practice	of	American	 and	 European	 courts	 was	 to	 apply	 such	 law	 to	 prize	cases.38	Modern	cases	 in	which	federal	courts	are	urged	to	apply	international	law	may	be	quite	different,	both	because	the	content	and	status	of	the	asserted	international	law	rules	may	be	far	less	certain	and	precise	than	the	rules	that	governed	prize	cases39	and	because	the	availability	of	such	international	law	rules	as	a	rule	of	decision	governing	the	parties’	rights	and	responsibilities	may	be	far	more	open	to	contestation.40	
B.	Changes	in	Domestic	Law:	The	Example	of	Multilateral	Treaty	
Reservations	A	second	way	in	which	changes	in	underlying	legal	rules	might	change	the	duties	of	courts	(and	the	judiciary’s	consequent	“role”	in	foreign	affairs)	involves	changes	in	domestic	law.	Changes	in	US	treaty	 practice	 provide	 a	 possible	 illustration	 of	 this	 second	phenomenon.	 Though	 treaties	 reflect	 international	 law	commitments	between	the	United	States	and	foreign	nations,	they	also	constitute	a	source	of	domestic	law	that	is,	at	least	potentially,	enforceable	 by	 appropriate	 parties	 in	 federal	 courts. 41 	But	 not	
 37.	 See	Bederman,	supra	note	15,	at	33	(“The	law	of	naval	prize	has	an	extraordinarily	rich	history,	longer	and	deeper	than	perhaps	any	other	discrete	subject	matter	in	the	law	of	nations.”).	38 .	 See,	 e.g.,	 Golove	 &	 Hulsebosch,	 supra	 note	 20,	 at	 1001	 (observing	 that	 both	English	and	American	courts	had	applied	the	law	of	nations	in	prize	cases	since	long	before	the	Constitution’s	adoption);	Bederman,	supra	note	15,	at	51	(“[F]rom	time	immemorial,	when	a	national	court	adjudicated	a	case	of	a	maritime	capture	it	was	obliged	to	follow	international	law.”).	39.	 See,	e.g.,	 J.	Patrick	Kelly,	The	Twilight	of	Customary	 International	Law,	40	VA.	 J.	INT’L.	L.	449,	469-75	(2000)	(discussing	methodological	challenges	of	identifying	modern	norms	of	customary	international	law).	40.	 Compare,	e.g.,	Curtis	A.	Bradley	&	Jack	L.	Goldsmith,	Customary	International	Law	
as	 Federal	 Common	 Law:	 A	 Critique	 of	 the	Modern	 Position,	 110	HARV.	 L.	 REV.	 815,	 827	(1997)	 (contesting	 the	 view	 that	 federal	 courts	 possess	 a	 general	 power	 to	 apply	customary	 international	 law	 as	 a	 rule	 of	 decision	 in	 modern	 cases),	with,	 e.g.,	 Harold	Hongju	 Koh,	 Is	 International	 Law	 State	 Law?,	 111	 HARV.	 L.	 REV.	 1824,	 1824-27	 (1998)	(contending	that	customary	international	law	is	federal	law	enforceable	by	federal	courts).	41.	 See	U.S.	CONST.	art.	VI	(defining	treaties	“made	…	under	the	Authority	of	the	United	States,”	along	with	the	Constitution	and	federal	laws,	as	the	“supreme	Law	of	the	Land”);	
 
2020]	 "JUDICIAL	ROLE"	&	JUDICIAL	DUTY	 1247	every	treaty	commitment	pledged	by	the	United	States	necessarily	establishes	 the	 type	 of	 legal	 right	 that	 is	 enforceable	 by	 courts.	Consider,	for	example,	the	1783	Treaty	of	Paris,	which	formalized	the	end	of	hostilities	with	Great	Britain	and	brought	the	American	Revolution	 to	 a	 close.42	Certain	 commitments	 in	 that	 document	undoubtedly	 pledged	 direct	 commitments	 of	 the	 type	 that	were	administrable	by	 courts.	 For	example,	 the	 treaty’s	 fourth	article,	which	pledged	that	“[c]reditors	on	either	[s]ide	shall	meet	with	no	[l]awful	[i]mpediment	to	the	[r]ecovery	of	the	full	[v]alue	.	.	.	of	all	bona	fide	[d]ebts	heretofore	contracted,”43	was	famously	enforced	by	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 notwithstanding	 a	 conflicting	 Virginia	statute	in	its	landmark	1796	decision	in	Ware	v.	Hylton.44	But	the	very	next	article	 in	 that	 treaty	conferred	no	directly	enforceable	individual	 right,	but	 rather	merely	pledged	 that	Congress	would	“earnestly	 recommend	 it	 to	 the	 Legislatures	 of	 the	 respective	States”	that	loyalist	property	confiscated	during	the	Revolution	be	restored. 45 	Because	 this	 commitment	 could	 be	 discharged	 by	Congress	through	a	mere	recommendation	to	the	state	legislatures,	it	 created	 no	 judicially	 enforceable	 entitlement	 that	 could	 be	asserted	 by	 disappointed	 loyalists	 seeking	 restoration	 of	 their	confiscated	property.46	Chief	 Justice	 Marshall’s	 1829	 decision	 in	 Foster	 v.	 Neilson,	recognized	 a	 similar	 distinction	 between	 what	 that	 decision	characterized	 as	 commitments	 “address[ed]	 .	 .	 .	 to	 the	 political”	
 
id.	 art.	 III,	 §	2	 (providing	 that	 the	 judicial	 power	 of	 the	United	 States	 “shall	 extend”	 to,	among	 other	 cases,	 those	 “arising	 under	 …	 Treaties	made”	 under	 the	 authority	 of	 the	United	States).	42.	 FLAHERTY,	supra	note	3,	at	50.	43.	 Definitive	Treaty	of	Peace,	U.S.-Gr.	Brit.,	art.	4,	Sept.	3,	1783,	8	Stat.	80.	44.	 Ware	v.	Hylton,	3	U.S.	(3	Dall.)	199,	242-45	(1796);	see	also	FLAHERTY,	supra	note	3,	at	73	(identifying	as	“the	first	judicial	review	case	insofar	as	…	the	Court	invalidated	the	act	of	a	legislature	in	the	name	of	higher	law”).	45.	 Definitive	Treaty	of	Peace,	supra	note	43,	at	art.	5;	see	also	Michael	D.	Ramsey,	A	
Textual	 Approach	 to	 Treaty	 Non-Self-Execution,	 2015	 BYU	 L.	 REV.	 1639,	 1650	 (2015)	(identifying	Article	5	of	the	Treaty	of	Paris	as	an	illustration	of	“treaty	provisions	that	do	not	contain	a	rule	of	decision	for	courts”).	46.	 See,	e.g.,	Cornwall	v.	Hoyt,	7	Conn.	420,	428	(1829)	(recognizing	the	fifth	Article	of	the	Treaty	of	Paris	as	merely	recommending	the	states	voluntarily	adopt	a	remedy	that	Congress	“had	no	power	to	enforce”	itself);	Read	v.	Read,	9	Va.	(5	Call.)	160,	209-10	(1804)	(recognizing	that	Article	5	was	recommendatory	to	the	states	only	and	did	not	create	a	directly	enforceable	right).	
 
1248	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	departments	and	those	addressed	to	the	judiciary.47	As	elaborated	by	later	cases,	the	distinction	Marshall	drew	came	to	stand	for	the	principle	 that	 some	 treaty	 commitments	 are	 “self-executing.”	 in	that	 they	 “automatically	 have	 effect	 as	 domestic	 law.”	 48 	Other	commitments,	 though	 constituting	 valid	 international	 law	commitments,	do	not	“by	themselves	 function	as	binding	 federal	law”	and	are	thus	considered	“non-self-executing.”49	Throughout	the	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries,	the	task	of	distinguishing	 self-executing	 treaty	provisions	 from	non-self-executing	provisions	involved	primarily	parsing	the	relevant	treaty	language	along	with	whatever	evidence	of	extrinsic	intent	of	the	 treaty’s	 framers	 was	 deemed	 admissible. 50 	This	 task	 was	facilitated	to	a	significant	extent	by	the	predominance	of	bilateral	treaties	as	the	near-exclusive	paradigm	of	US	treaty-making	during	the	 early	 nineteenth	 century. 51 	Though	 hardly	 free	 from	difficulties,52	the	discernment	of	presumed	intent	from	a	document	produced	through	bilateral	negotiations	between	contracting	state	parties	 involved	 fewer	 interpretive	 challenges	 than	 those	 that	typically	 attend	 the	 multilateral	 paradigm	 that	 had	 come	 to	predominate	 US	 treaty-making	 by	 the	 middle	 decades	 of	 the	twentieth	century.53	Because	such	treaties	result	from	multilateral	
 47.	 Foster	v.	Neilson,	27	U.S.	(2	Pet.)	253,	314	(1829).	48.	 Medellín	v.	Texas,	552	U.S.	491,	504-05	(2008).	49.	 Id.	50.	 Compare,	e.g.,	Cameron	Septic	Tank	Co.	v.	City	of	Knoxville,	227	U.S.	39,	43-49	(1913)	(concluding	that	a	treaty	addressing	patent	lengths	should	be	construed	as	non-self-executing	notwithstanding	putatively	clear	treaty	language	where	drafting	history	and	subsequent	 Congressional	 action	 suggested	 a	 more	 limited	 understanding),	 with,	 e.g.,	United	States	v.	Forty-Three	Gallons	of	Whiskey,	93	U.S.	188,	195-98	(1876)	(concluding	that	a	treaty	between	the	United	States	and	an	Indian	tribe	restricting	sale	of	alcohol	was	self-executing	based	on	language	and	purpose	of	the	agreement).	51.	 A	1968	compilation	prepared	by	the	Assistant	Legal	Advisor	to	the	Department	of	State	identified	only	two	multilateral	agreements	entered	into	by	the	United	States	prior	to	 the	Civil	War—one	of	which	concerned	construction	of	a	cemetery	by	European	and	American	 consular	 officials	 with	 the	 other	 focused	 on	 commerce,	 consular	 rights,	 and	shipping	in	Samoa.	1	CHARLES	I.	BEVANS,	TREATIES	AND	OTHER	INTERNATIONAL	AGREEMENTS	OF	THE	UNITED	STATES	OF	AMERICA,	1776-1949,	iii-ix,	1-6	(1968).	52.	 The	Marshall	Court	famously	revised	its	interpretation	of	the	treaty	with	Spain	that	had	been	the	subject	of	the	dispute	in	Foster	in	a	later	case	after	reviewing	the	Spanish-language	 version	 of	 the	 treaty,	 which	 lent	 additional	 credence	 to	 the	 self-execution	interpretation.	United	States	v.	Percheman,	32	U.S.	(7	Pet.)	51,	88–89	(1833).	53.	 See,	e.g.,	Kevin	C.	Kennedy,	Conditional	Approval	of	Treaties	by	the	U.S.	Senate,	19	LOY.	 L.A.	 INT’L	 &	 COMP.	 L.	 Rev.	 89,	 97–98	 (1996)	 (discussing	 statistics	 showing	 that	
 
2020]	 "JUDICIAL	ROLE"	&	JUDICIAL	DUTY	 1249	negotiations	among	nations	 that	may	have	significantly	different	internal	mechanisms	for	ensuring	treaty	compliance,	such	treaties	rarely	 speak	with	 clarity	 to	 the	 precise	modes	 in	which	 nations	should	 go	 about	 carrying	 into	 execution	 their	 treaty	commitments.54	The	 mid-twentieth-century	 ascendance	 of	 multilateral	treaties	 also	 introduced	 a	 further	 complication	 arising	 from	 the	growing	tolerance	under	international	law	of	treaty	reservations,	which	allowed	state	parties	to	join	multilateral	agreements	subject	to	reservations	that	did	not	require	the	mutual	assent	of	all	other	contracting	 parties. 55 	The	 growing	 acceptance	 of	 treaty	reservations	 on	 the	 international	 plane	 in	 the	 mid-twentieth	century	 coincided	 with	 a	 movement	 by	 political	 forces	 in	 the	United	States—led	by	Ohio	Senator	 Joseph	Bricker—to	 limit	 the	domestic	 legal	 effect	 of	 multilateral	 human	 rights	 treaties. 56	Though	Bricker	and	his	allies	initially	mobilized	behind	a	proposed	constitutional	amendment	that	would	limit	treaties’	self-executing	effect	 as	 a	 general	 matter,	 the	 energies	 associated	 with	 their	movement	were	eventually	channeled	toward	efforts	to	limit	the	domestic	legal	effect	of	multilateral	human	rights	treaties	through	treaty	 reservations. 57 	Throughout	 the	 later	 portion	 of	 the	twentieth	century,	the	Senate	conditioned	its	“advice	and	consent”	to	multiple	multilateral	 human	 rights	 treaties	 on	 “reservations,”	“understandings,”	 or	 “declarations”	 purporting	 to	 limit	 those	treaties’	domestic	legal	effect.58	
 multilateral	 treatymaking	 nearly	 doubled	 during	 the	 period	 from	 1946	 to	 1990,	 as	compared	to	the	period	from	1896	to	1945,	while	the	overall	number	of	bilateral	treaties	declined).	54.	 	Medellín	v.	Texas,	552	U.S.	491,	552	(Breyer,	J.,	dissenting).	55.	 See,	e.g.,	Ryan	Goodman,	Human	Rights	Treaties,	 Invalid	Reservations,	and	State	
Consent,	96	AM.	J.	INT’L	L.	531,	533–34	(2002)	(discussing	the	mid-twentieth	century	shift	away	 from	 the	 “unanimity	 rule”	 in	 state	 practice,	 which	 allowed	 only	 those	 state	reservations	 to	multilateral	 treaties	 that	 were	 “accepted	 by	 all	 the	 other	 parties,”	 and	toward	a	framework	that	was	more	permissive	of	unilateral	reservations).	56.	 See	FLAHERTY,	supra	note	3,	at	224–25	(discussing	the	background	and	political	context	of	the	proposed	Bricker	Amendment).	57.	 See	id.	at	225–26	(discussing	the	failure	of	the	proposed	Bricker	Amendment	and	its	subsequent	influence	on	U.S.	treaty-making	practice).	58 .	 Id.	 at	 226–27;	 see	 also,	 e.g.,	 Louis	 Henkin,	 U.S.	 Ratification	 of	 Human	 Rights	
Conventions:	The	Ghost	of	Senator	Bricker,	89	AM.	J.	INT’L	L.	341,	346–48	(1995)	(identifying	multiple	multilateral	human	rights	treaties,	which	the	United	States	joined	subject	to	such	reservations).	
 
1250	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	Courts	 that	 have	 considered	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 the	Constitution	 empowers	 the	 Senate	 to	 condition	 its	 assent	 to	treaties	in	this	manner—and	thereby	limit	their	domestic	status	as	judicially	 enforceable	 “supreme	Law”—have	generally	held	 such	reservations	 permissible.59	But	 the	 question	 is	 hardly	 free	 from	controversy. 60 	And	 even	 apart	 from	 such	 express	 reservations,	questions	 may	 frequently	 arise	 regarding	 the	 proper	interpretation	 of	 multilateral	 treaty	 commitments	 that	 might	plausibly	 be	 read	 to	 incorporate	 either	 a	 direct	 commitment	enforceable	by	the	 judiciary	or	a	more	abstract	goal	or	objective	that	is	more	properly	directed	to	implementation	by	the	political	branches.61	The	significant	changes	in	treaty	practice	that	occurred	in	the	twentieth	 century—both	 at	 the	 international	 level	 and	 in	 the	practices	of	the	US	political	branches—may	render	the	judiciary’s	late	eighteenth	and	early	nineteenth	century	treaty	jurisprudence	a	 potentially	 inapposite	 guide	 for	modern	 treaty	 interpretation.	Professor	 Flaherty	 demonstrates	 a	 robust	 commitment	 among	jurists	in	the	early	republic	to	enforcing	treaties	as	domestic	law	on	 the	 same	 plane	 as	 federal	 statutes. 62 	But	 even	 that	 early	jurisprudence	 reflected	 a	 recognition	 that	 some	 treaty	commitments	might	be	directed	to	institutions	other	than	courts.63	To	 the	 extent	 modern	 treaty-makers	 have	 chosen	 to	 rely	 more	extensively	 on	 such	 non-judicially	 enforceable	 commitments—whether	 through	 explicit	 treaty	 language,	 express	 treaty	reservations,	or	the	choice	of	vague	and	aspirational	pledges	rather	
 59.	 See,	e.g.,	Ramsey,	 supra	 note	45,	 at	1659;	 see	also	 Igartúa-de	 la	Rosa	v.	United	States,	417	F.3d	145,	150	 (1st	Cir.	2005)	 (en	banc);	but	 see	Power	Auth.	of	N.Y.	 v.	 Fed.	Power	Comm’n,	247	F.2d	538,	543-44	(D.C.	Cir.	1957)	(holding	a	Senate	reservation	did	not	limit	the	domestic	effect	of	a	federal	treaty),	vacated	sub	nom..	Am.	Pub.	Power	Ass’n	v.	Power	Auth.	of	N.Y.,	355	U.S.	64	(1957).	60.	 Compare,	e.g.,	Henkin,	supra	note	58,	at	346	(arguing	that	unilateral	declarations	of	non-self-execution	are	contrary	to	the	Supremacy),	with,	e.g.,	Curtis	A.	Bradley	&	Jack	L.	Goldsmith,	Treaties,	Human	Rights,	and	Conditional	Consent,	149	U.	PA.	L.	REV.	399,	446–51	(2000)	(defending	constitutionality	of	declarations	of	non-self-execution).	61.	 See	Ramsey,	supra	note	45,	at	1654–58	(contending	 that	vague,	ambiguous,	or	aspirational	language	in	treaty	provisions	may	be	more	properly	interpreted	as	reflecting	non-self-executing	political	commitments).	62.	 See	FLAHERTY,	supra	note	3,	at	73-75,	83,	222–24.	63.	 See	Ware	supra	note	47	and	accompanying	text.	
 
2020]	 "JUDICIAL	ROLE"	&	JUDICIAL	DUTY	 1251	than	concrete	commitments64—the	refusal	of	courts	to	attempt	to	craft	legal	doctrines	from	such	commitments	would	hardly	reflect	an	abdication	of	judicial	duty.	To	the	contrary,	such	a	refusal	may	merely	 reflect	 adherence	 to	 the	 design	 choice	 of	 the	constitutionally	 authorized	 lawmaking	 authorities	 (i.e.,	 the	President,	by	and	with	the	advice	and	consent	of	two-thirds	of	the	Senate).65	This	would	be	precisely	what	judicial	duty	commands.	
C.	Accommodating	Legal	Change:	The	Law	of	Interpretation	A	third	category	of	legal	change	that	might	plausibly	affect	the	judiciary’s	proper	 “role”	 in	 foreign	affairs	controversies	 involves	the	body	of	 legal	 rules,	 principles,	 presumptions,	 and	 guidelines	through	which	the	judiciary	identifies	the	linguistic	content	of	legal	instruments	and	translates	 that	 language	 into	authoritative	 legal	commands—what	William	Baude	and	Stephen	Sachs	have	termed	the	 “law	 of	 interpretation.” 66 	Though	 ubiquitous	 in	 our	 legal	practices,	 the	 precise	 legal	 and	 jurisprudential	 status	 of	 such	interpretive	 rules	 and	 principles	 has	 long	 been	 ambiguous	 and	contestable. 67 	But	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 deny	 that	 such	 interpretive	principles	have	played	a	significant	role	in	shaping	the	judiciary’s	engagement	with	foreign	affairs	controversies.68	The	 ambiguity	 surrounding	 the	 precise	 legal	 status	 and	legitimacy	 of	 the	 judiciary’s	 interpretive	 rules	 is	 matched	 by	 a	similar	 ambiguity	 surrounding	 the	 mechanisms	 through	 which	
 64.	 Cf.	 Ramsey,	 supra	 note	 45,	 at	 1657–58	 (suggesting	 that	 aspirational	 nature	 of	treaty	commitments	may	be	an	indicia	of	their	status	as	pledges	to	be	implemented	by	the	political	branches	rather	than	the	judiciary).	65.	 U.S.	Const.	art.	II,	§	2.	66.	 William	Baude	&	Stephen	E.	Sachs,	The	Law	of	Interpretation,	130	HARV.	L.	REV.	1079	(2017).	67 .	 Id.	 at	 1085	 (observing	 that	 recent	 debates	 have	 overlooked	 the	 role	 of	 legal	principles	by	assuming	“that	legal	interpretation	is	just	regular	interpretation,	applied	to	legal	 texts”);	but	 cf.	Ethan	 J.	 Leib	&	Michael	 Serota,	The	 Costs	 of	 Consensus	 in	 Statutory	
Construction,	 120	 YALE	 L.J.	 ONLINE	 47,	 58–62	 (2010)	 (arguing	 against	 according	 stare	decisis	effect	to	interpretive	methodology	in	the	statutory	interpretation	context).	68.	 See	FLAHERTY,	supra	note	3,	at	75–77,	245–49	(discussing	the	“Charming	Betsy”	presumption	that	federal	laws	be	read	in	a	manner	consistent	with	international	law	to	the	extent	possible);	 id.	 at	84–85	(discussing	 the	“last-in-time”	rule	 for	addressing	conflicts	between	the	requirements	between	federal	statutes	and	federal	treaties);	 id.	at	128–29,		194–98	 (discussing	 presumption	 of	 deference	 to	 Executive	 interpretation	 of	 federal	treaties).	
 
1252	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	such	interpretive	rules	and	maxims	may	permissibly	change.	Some	scholars	 take	 the	 position	 that	 the	 interpretation	 of	 legal	 texts	should	always	be	guided	by	the	interpretive	rules	and	maxims	that	were	widely	accepted	at	the	time	a	particular	legal	instrument	was	enacted. 69 	Others	 take	 the	 position	 that	 interpretive	 rules	 and	practices	may	permissibly	change	over	time	in	ways	that	diverge	from	 those	 that	 might	 have	 been	 anticipated	 by	 the	 initial	enactors.70	But	even	under	 the	more	 restrictive	view	 that	would	limit	interpretive	principles	to	those	that	were	in	place	at	the	time	of	enactment,	 changes	 in	background	conditions	or	assumptions	may	 force	 officials	 to	 adapt	 the	 applicable	 interpretive	 rules	 to	address	the	new	state	of	affairs.71	The	 presumption	 against	 extraterritorial	 application	 of	federal	 statutes	 supplies	 a	 possible	 example	 of	 this	 latter	phenomenon.	The	presumption	against	extraterritorial	application	of	federal	statutory	law	emerged	at	an	early	period	of	our	nation’s	history.72	But	as	originally	formulated,	the	presumption	reflected	a	mere	 corollary	 of	 the	 assumedly	 limited	 scope	 of	 prescriptive	jurisdiction	 under	 international	 law.	 As	 Justice	 Joseph	 Story	explained	in	his	1824	decision	in	The	Apollon—a	canonical	early	citation	 for	 the	 presumption	 against	 extraterritoriality—“[t]he	laws	 of	 no	 nation	 can	 justly	 extend	 beyond	 its	 own	 territories	except	so	far	as	regards	its	own	citizens.”73	Thus,	“however	general	and	comprehensive	the	phrases	used	 in	our	municipal	 laws	may	be,”	Story	wrote,	they	must	always	be	“restricted	in	construction	to	
 69.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Baude	&	 Sachs,	 supra	 note	 66,	 at	 1132–36	 (arguing	 that	 interpretive	rules	that	“determine	the	legal	content	of	a	written	instrument	upon	its	adoption”	should	be	held	stable	over	time).	70.	 See,	 e.g.,	William	N.	 Eskridge,	 Jr.	 &	 Philip	 P.	 Frickey,	The	 Supreme	 Court,	 1993	
Term—Foreword:	Law	as	Equilibrium,	108	HARV.	L.	REV.	26,	68–69	(1994)	(contending	that	the	Supreme	Court	possesses	and	exercises	the	authority	to	adapt	“interpretive	regimes”	to	reflect	judicial	preferences).	71.	 Cf.	Caleb	Nelson,	Originalism	and	Interpretive	Conventions,	70	U.	CHI.	L.	REV.	519,	589–90	 (2003)	 (observing	 that	 “the	 criteria	 for	 the	 proper	 application	 of	 some	 of	 the	Constitution’s	 words	 and	 phrases”	 were	 likely	 “not	 fully	 specified	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	founding”	 and	 that	 “changed	 circumstances	 …	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 expose”	 latent	ambiguities	in	the	constitutional	text).	72.	 The	Appollon,	22	U.S.	(9	Wheat.)	362,	370-72	(1824).	73.	 Id.	at	370.	
 
2020]	 "JUDICIAL	ROLE"	&	JUDICIAL	DUTY	 1253	places	and	persons,	upon	whom	the	legislature	has	authority	and	jurisdiction.”74	As	 the	 foremost	 American	 expert	 on	 international	 law	principles	governing	the	conflict	of	multiple	sovereigns’	laws,	and	the	 author	 of	 the	 treatise	 that	 established	 conflict	 of	 laws	 as	 a	distinctive	 field	 of	 legal	 studies, 75 	Story	 was	 decidedly	 well	positioned	to	opine	on	this	issue.	In	view	of	the	strongly	territorial	conception	 of	 sovereign	 jurisdiction	 that	 predominated	 in	 late	eighteenth	 and	 early	 nineteenth-century	 international	 law,76	the	presumption	against	extraterritoriality	could	be	seen	as	little	more	than	 a	 specific	 instantiation	 of	 the	 equally	 venerable	 Charming	
Betsy	 canon—i.e.,	 the	 principle	 that	 a	 statute	 should	 not	 be	construed	to	violate	an	established	norm	of	international	law	if	an	alternative	 interpretation	 were	 available. 77 	Like	 all	 rules	 of	international	 law,	 the	 operative	 judicial	 presumption	 was	 that	Congress	could	override	this	directive	through	a	sufficiently	clear	expression	 of	 statutory	 intent.78	And	 throughout	 the	 nineteenth	century,	 the	 predominant	 question	 surrounding	 the	extraterritorial	 effect	 of	 federal	 law	 was	 whether	 Congress	 had	
 74.	 Id.	75.	 See	generally	JOSEPH	STORY,	COMMENTARIES	ON	THE	CONFLICT	OF	LAWS,	FOREIGN	AND	DOMESTIC,	 IN	 REGARD	 TO	 CONTRACTS,	 RIGHTS,	 AND	 REMEDIES,	 AND	 ESPECIALLY	 IN	 REGARD	 TO	MARRIAGES,	 DIVORCES,	WILLS,	 SUCCESSIONS,	 AND	 JUDGMENTS	 (Hilliard,	 Gray	 1834);	 see	 also	Caleb	Nelson,	State	and	Federal	Models	of	the	Interaction	Between	Statutes	and	Unwritten	
Law,	80	U.	CHI.	L.	REV.	657,	671	(2013)	(observing	that	early	efforts	by	American	jurists	to	systemize	thinking	around	the	problem	of	conflicts	of	law	“did	not	really	take	root	until”	the	1834	publication	of	Story’s	“acclaimed”	treatise).	76 .	 See,	 e.g.,	 J.	 Andrew	 Kent,	 A	 Textual	 and	 Historical	 Case	 Against	 a	 Global	
Constitution,	 95	GEO.	 L.J.	 463,	 492	 (2007)	 (“It	 is	 undoubtedly	 true	 that	 eighteenth-	 and	nineteenth-century	legal	thought	was	heavily	territorial.	Broadly	speaking,	a	nation’s	law	was	viewed	as	 territorially	 limited,	meaning	 that	neither	 its	proscriptive	power	nor	 its	protections	were	thought	to	operate	extraterritorially.”).	77.	 See,	 e.g.,	 William	 S.	 Dodge,	 Understanding	 the	 Presumption	 Against	
Extraterritoriality,	 16	 BERKELEY	 J.	 INT’L	 L.	 85,	 114	 (1998)	 (describing	 the	 nineteenth	century	 presumption	 against	 extraterritoriality	 as	 the	 product	 of	 combining	 “an	international	law	rule	that	the	laws	of	a	nation	cannot	extend	beyond	its	own	territory	with	a	presumption	that	Congress	does	not	intend	to	violate	international	law”).	78.	 Cf.	Brown	v.	United	States,	12	U.S.	(8	Cranch)	110,	128–29	(1814)	(characterizing	international	practice	as	“a	guide	which	the	sovereign	follows	or	abandons	at	his	will”	and	suggesting	 that	 it	 is	 for	Congress,	 rather	 than	 the	President	or	 the	 courts	 to	determine	whether	customary	international	law	should	be	followed).	
 
1254	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	expressed	its	intent	to	deviate	from	international	law	limitations	with	sufficient	clarity.79	Beginning	 in	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century,	 however,	 the	international	 law	 framework	 undergirding	 the	 presumption	against	 extraterritoriality	 began	 to	 shift	 significantly.	 At	 the	international	 level,	 the	 assumption	 of	 exclusively	 territorial	national	 jurisdiction	 began	 to	 yield	 to	 a	 much	 more	 expansive	conception	 of	 state	 authority. 80 	At	 around	 the	 same	 time,	 the	predominant	 assumption	 of	 territoriality	 as	 the	 governing	framework	 for	 determining	 the	 scope	 of	 sovereign	 lawmaking	authority	within	the	United	States	came	under	withering	attack	by	“Legal	 Realist”	 critics. 81 	By	 the	 later	 portion	 of	 the	 twentieth	century,	 the	strictly	 territorial	conception	of	sovereign	authority	that	had	motivated	the	initial	adoption	of	the	presumption	against	extraterritoriality	 had	 all	 but	 disappeared	 on	 the	 international	stage	and	had	ceded	its	position	as	the	once-dominant	paradigm	for	thinking	about	conflicts	of	law	within	US	courts.82	With	the	original	conceptual	foundations	of	the	presumption	against	extraterritoriality	thus	eroded,	the	judiciary	faced	a	choice	
 79.	 See,	e.g.,	Patterson	v.	Bark	Eudora,	190	U.S.	169,	172–74	(1903)	(determining	that	Congress	had	expressed	its	intent	to	regulate	the	wages	paid	to	seamen	on	foreign	vessels	with	sufficient	clarity).	80.	 A	seminal	development	in	this	regard	was	the	1927	decision	of	the	Permanent	Court	of	International	Justice	in	the	famed	S.S.	Lotus	decision,	which	explicitly	recognized	that	international	law	did	not	lay	down	“a	general	prohibition	to	the	effect	that	States	may	not	 extend	 the	application	of	 their	 laws	and	 the	 jurisdiction	of	 their	 courts	 to	persons,	property	and	acts	outside	their	 territory,”	but	rather,	subject	 to	specific	exceptions,	 left	each	state	free	“to	adopt	the	principle	which	it	regards	as	best	and	most	suitable.”	The	Case	of	the	S.S.	Lotus	(Fr.	v.	Turk.),	Judgment,	1927	P.C.I.J.	(ser.	A)	10,	at	19	(Sept	7);	see	also,	
e.g.,	 Dodge,	 supra	 note	 77,	 at	 114	 (pointing	 to	 the	 Lotus	 decision	 as	 support	 for	 the	proposition	 that	 “[i]nternational	 law	 provides	 no	 basis	 for	 the	 presumption	 against	extraterritoriality	today”).	81.	 See	Kermit	Roosevelt,	III,	The	Myth	of	Choice	of	Law:	Rethinking	Conflicts,	97	MICH.	L.	REV.	2448,	2458–61	(1999)	(discussing	 the	Legal	Realist	 critique	of	 the	predominant	territorialist	conception	of	conflicts);	cf.	Dodge,	supra	note	77,	at	114-15	(discussing	the	inability	 of	 modern	 domestic	 conflicts	 theory	 to	 justify	 the	 presumption	 against	extraterritoriality).	82.	 See,	e.g.,	Kal	Raustiala,	The	Geography	of	Justice,	73	FORDHAM	L.	REV.	2501,	2512	(2005)	(observing	that	“geographic	borders	.	.	.		coincide	quite	imperfectly	with	the	reach	of	 national	 laws”	 and	 that	 “[a]n	 increasingly	 interdependent	 and	 globalized	world	 has	rendered	strict	territorial	limits	on	jurisdiction	increasingly	unworkable”);	Nelson,	supra	note	75,	at	679–93	(discussing	the	“Conflicts	Revolution”	of	the	1960’s	and	1970’s	during	which	 the	 majority	 of	 U.S.	 jurisdictions	 moved	 away	 from	 strict	 territoriality	 as	 an	organizing	principle	of	conflicts	jurisprudence).	
 
2020]	 "JUDICIAL	ROLE"	&	JUDICIAL	DUTY	 1255	regarding	 how	 to	 respond	 to	 this	 change.	 One	 conceptually	available	 response	may	 have	 been	 to	 abandon	 the	 presumption	and	instead	interpret	federal	statutes	to	reach	the	full	extent	of	the	nation’s	 permissible	 jurisdiction	 under	 international	 law. 83 	But	this	was	not	the	only	option	available	to	the	courts.	One	that	the	Supreme	 Court	 actively	 embraced, 84 	was	 that	 the	 presumption	against	 extraterritoriality	 should	 be	 adhered	 to	 as	 part	 of	 the	federal	 law	 of	 interpretation	 unless	 and	 until	 that	 presumption	was	displaced	by	Congress.	The	choice	of	this	latter	option	was	hardly	unreasonable.	After	all,	the	presumption	against	extraterritoriality	had	been	part	of	the	interpretive	practices	of	federal	courts	for	more	than	a	century.85	Replacing	 that	 presumption	 with	 an	 alternative	 presumption	threatened	 to	 unsettle	 the	 expectations	 underlying	 numerous	earlier-adopted	 federal	 statutes. 86 	Nor	 was	 it	 obvious	 that	 a	different	 rule	 of	 construction	 should	 apply	 to	 statutes	 adopted	after	the	shift	in	understanding	regarding	the	territorial	limits	of	national	 legislation.	 Given	 the	 longstanding	 adherence	 to	 the	presumption	against	extraterritoriality,	both	Congress	and	 those	subject	 to	 its	 enactments	 might	 reasonably	 assume	 that	 the	presumption	would	continue	to	apply	in	the	manner	it	had	unless	
 83.	 See,	 e.g.,	 John	H.	 Knox,	A	Presumption	 Against	 Extrajurisdictionality,	 104	AM.	 J.	INT’L	L.	351	(2010)	(urging	a	presumption	that	federal	statutes	be	read	to	extend	to	the	permissible	 scope	 of	 U.S.	 jurisdiction	 under	 international	 law);	 cf.	 Zachary	 R.	 Clopton,	
Replacing	 the	 Presumption	 Against	 Extraterritoriality,	 94	 B.U.	 L.	 REV.	 1,	 24–35	 (2014)	(arguing	 that	 international	 law	 should	 define	 the	 presumptive	 scope	 of	 civil,	 but	 not	criminal,	federal	statutes).	84.	 See	EEOC	v.	Arabian	Am.	Oil	Co.	(Aramco),	499	U.S.	244,	248	(1991)	(citing	Foley	Bros.,	 Inc.	 v.	 Filardo,	 336	 U.S.	 281,	 285	 (1949))(““[L]egislation	 of	 Congress,	 unless	 a	contrary	 intent	appears,	 is	meant	 to	apply	only	within	 the	 territorial	 jurisdiction	of	 the	United	States.”).	85.	 See	The	Appollon,	22	U.S.	(9	Wheat.)	362,	370-72	(1824).	86.	 Similar	 interpretive	challenges	attend	other	circumstances	 in	which	courts	are	called	upon	 to	determine	 the	 jurisdictional	 reach	of	 statutes	 that	were	adopted	against	background	legal	assumptions	that	have	changed	over	time.	Compare,	e.g.,	Archer	Daniels	Midland	Co.	v.	Seven	Up	Bottling	Co.,	746	So.	2d	966	(1999)	(interpreting	a	state	antitrust	statute	 adopted	 in	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century	 to	 exclude	 transactions	 in	 interstate	commerce	that	would	have	been	deemed	outside	the	scope	of	state	regulatory	authority	under	restrictive	judicial	interpretations	of	the	Commerce	Clause	that	predominated	at	the	time	of	the	statute’s	enactment),	with,	e.g.,	Freeman	Indus.,	LLC	v.	Eastman	Chem.	Co.,	172	S.W.3d	512	(2005)	(interpreting	a	state	antitrust	statute	enacted	during	the	same	era	as	reaching	 all	 transactions	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 statutory	 language	 that	 state	 could	permissibly	regulate	under	modern	Commerce	Clause	jurisprudence).	
 
1256	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	and	 until	 Congress	 chose	 to	 override	 the	 presumption—either	through	the	inclusion	of	explicit	overriding	language	in	a	particular	statute	or	through	a	more	general	interpretive	directive	similar	to	those	found	in	the	so-called	“Dictionary	Act.”87	In	short,	the	twentieth-century	shift	in	thinking	regarding	the	centrality	of	territory	to	a	nation’s	lawmaking	authority	revealed	a	latent	ambiguity	regarding	the	status	of	the	presumption	against	extraterritoriality.	 On	 one	 understanding,	 it	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 a	mechanism	 for	 limiting	 Congressional	 enactments	 to	 the	presumedly	 limited	 scope	 of	 the	 federal	 government’s	jurisdictional	authority	under	international	law.	As	so	understood,	the	 presumption	 might	 reasonably	 be	 seen	 as	 flexible	 and	adaptable	such	that	the	presumption	itself	should	adapt	to	mirror	any	 corresponding	 changes	 in	 background	 principles	 of	international	law.	Alternatively,	the	presumption	could	be	seen	as	a	mechanism	for	discerning	the	actual	intent	of	Congress	by	placing	the	 interpretive	 burden	 on	 proponents	 of	 extraterritorial	application	 to	 express	 their	 goal	 through	 sufficiently	 clear	statutory	language.	Alternative	paths	to	addressing	this	ambiguity	were	certainly	available	to	the	judiciary.	But	it	is	far	from	clear	that	either	these	alternative	paths	or	 the	path	 that	 the	 Supreme	Court	 eventually	settled	 on—i.e.,	 adhering	 to	 a	 reasonably	 strong	 presumption	against	 statutory	 extraterritoriality—were	 affirmatively	compelled	by	a	proper	understanding	of	“judicial	duty.”	Rather,	it	may	be	the	case	that	the	judiciary	sometimes	possesses	a	degree	of	discretion	 in	 choosing	 from	 among	 various	 equally	 permissible	mechanisms	of	discharging	 its	 judicial	duty	“to	say	what	the	 law	is.”88	And	while	the	Supreme	Court	might	reasonably	be	criticized	for	 having	 chosen	 the	 “wrong”	 option	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	
 87.	 See	1	U.S.C.	§	1	(setting	forth	a	limited	set	of	interpretive	prescriptions	relating	to	federal	 statutory	 language	 addressing	 “numbers,	 gender,	 and	 so	 forth”);	 see	 also,	 e.g.,	Nicholas	Quinn	Rosenkranz,	Federal	Rules	of	Statutory	 Interpretation,	115	HARV.	L.	REV.	2085,	 2145–56	 (2002)	 (urging	 Congress	 to	 enact	 a	 broader	 range	 of	 such	 interpretive	rules).	88.	 Maurice	Rosenberg,	Judicial	Discretion	of	the	Trial	Court,	Viewed	From	Above,	22	SYRACUSE	L.	REV.	635,	637	(1971).	(identifying	one	conception	of	judicial	“discretion”	with	the	idea	that,	in	some	cases,	a	court	may	be	“free	to	render	the	decision	it	chooses”	because	“legally	speaking,	…	there	is	no	officially	right	or	wrong	answer.”).	
 
2020]	 "JUDICIAL	ROLE"	&	JUDICIAL	DUTY	 1257	desirable	 public	 policy, 89 	such	 policy-based	 critiques	 differ	 in	meaningful	respects	from	a	charge	that	the	courts	have	failed	in	or	abdicated	their	duty	to	follow	applicable	law.	In	circumstances	like	those	 that	 confronted	 the	 judiciary	 during	 the	 transition	 of	 the	extraterritoriality	 presumption	 from	 a	 corollary	 of	 international	law	 into	 a	 more	 conventional	 “substantive”	 canon	 of	 statutory	interpretation, 90 	it	 is	 far	 from	 clear	 that	 any	 controlling	 legal	authority	provided	a	clear	legal	answer	to	the	questions	the	courts	were	called	upon	to	resolve.	
III.	 CAVEATS	Before	 concluding,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 emphasize	 a	 few	significant	caveats	that	should	clarify	and	circumscribe	the	claims	being	 made	 in	 this	 Essay.	 The	 primary	 thrust	 of	 this	 Essay	 is	conceptual	rather	than	empirical.	This	Essay	does	not	stake	out	any	strong	 claim	 regarding	 the	 content	 of	 the	 overall	 corpus	 of	background	legal	rules	relevant	to	the	judiciary’s	authority	in	the	realm	of	foreign	affairs	at	any	particular	point	in	American	history	or	how	those	rules	relate	to	those	in	existence	today.		The	three	specific	historical	examples	discussed	in	Part	II	are	intended	 principally	 to	 concretize	 the	 intuition	 animating	 this	Essay	and	to	render	somewhat	more	plausible	the	claim	that	the	judiciary’s	shifting	role	 in	foreign	affairs	controversies	over	time	might	be	at	 least	partially	attributable	to	changes	 in	background	law.	But	even	with	respect	to	these	specific	examples,	it	is	possible	that	 more	 detailed	 examination	 might	 reveal	 that	 the	 actual	changes	 in	background	law	that	have	taken	place	over	time	may	have	different	implications	for	the	judiciary’s	power	and	duty	than	those	gestured	at	in	the	foregoing	discussion.		In	considering	the	potential	significance	of	intervening	legal	change	on	 the	 judiciary’s	 proper	 role,	 this	Essay	has	 focused	on	
 89 .	 Cf.	 FLAHERTY,	 supra	 note	 3,	 at	 185–87	 (arguing	 that	 the	 presumption	 against	extraterritoriality,	in	conjunction	with	various	other	doctrines,	tends	to	limit	the	power	of	courts	and	Congress	on	international	stage	and	thus	threatens	disruption	to	a	functionalist	conception	of	the	separation	of	powers).	90.	 Cf.	Amy	Coney	Barrett,	Substantive	Canons	and	Faithful	Agency,	90	B.U.	L.	REV.	109,	127–28	 (2010)	 (observing	 that	 judicial	 use	 of	 substantive	 canons	 has	 a	 “long	 pedigree	[that]	makes	it	difficult	to	dismiss	their	use	as	fundamentally	inconsistent	with	the	limits	that	the	Constitution	imposes	upon	the	exercise	of	judicial	power.”).	
 
1258	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	non-constitutional	sources	of	law.	Determining	what	judicial	duty	requires	with	respect	to	claims	arising	under	the	Constitution	itself	introduces	a	host	of	additional	challenges	due	to	the	diversity	of	modern	views	regarding	the	appropriate	target	and	methodology	of	 constitutional	 interpretation. 91 	For	 those	 who	 view	 the	Constitution	 as	 a	 set	 of	 fixed	 directives	 that	 may	 only	 be	legitimately	 altered	 through	 the	Article	V	 amendment	process,92	the	passage	of	time	may	be	much	less	significant	for	comparing	the	appropriate	role	of	the	judiciary	at	different	points	in	our	history	because	 there	 have	 been	 only	 a	 small	 number	 of	 formal	amendments,	virtually	none	of	which	touch	in	a	meaningful	way	on	the	 allocation	 of	 foreign	 affairs	 powers. 93 	But	 for	 those	 whose	preferred	 theory	 of	 constitutional	 interpretation	 acknowledges	the	 permissibility	 of	 some	 forms	 of	 legitimate,	 extratextual	constitutional	 change, 94 	the	 passage	 of	 time	 may	 open	 up	interpretive	 challenges	 similar	 to	 those	 considered	 in	 this	Essay	because	the	governing	rules	of	constitutional	law	might	be	seen	as	meaningfully	different	at	different	points	in	our	history.95	Finally,	 though	 this	 Essay	 has	 focused	 on	 assessing	 the	judiciary’s	proper	“role”	from	the	perspective	of	judicial	duty,	this	is	 hardly	 the	 only	 perspective	 from	 which	 the	 question	 might	usefully	be	assessed.	A	starting	assumption	of	this	Essay	has	been	
 91.	 See,	e.g.,	Richard	H.	Fallon,	Jr.,	How	to	Choose	a	Constitutional	Theory,	87	CAL.	L.	REV.	535,	537	(1999)	(“Anyone	who	cares	about	constitutional	law	confronts	a	large	and	proliferating	number	of	constitutional	theories,	by	which	I	mean	theories	about	the	nature	of	the	United	States	Constitution	and	how	judges	should	interpret	and	apply	it.”).	92.	 See,	e.g.,	Stephen	E.	Sachs,	Originalism	as	a	Theory	of	Legal	Change,	38	HARV.	J.L.	&	PUB.	POL’Y	817,	865-67	(2015)	(characterizing	originalism	as	a	theory	that	requires	each	constitutional	 rule	 to	 be	 supported	 by	 a	 pedigree	 tracing	 back	 to	 either	 the	 original	Constitution	of	1787	or	a	validly	enacted	amendment).	93.	 Even	theories	that	assume	a	fixed	and	unchanging	constitutional	meaning	may	face	challenges	 in	determining	how	that	meaning	applies	 to	new	facts	or	 interacts	with	changes	in	non-constitutional	legal	rules.	See	Nelson,	supra	note	71,	at	589–98	(discussing	such	challenges).	94 .	 See,	 e.g.,	 Youngstown	 Sheet	 &	 Tube	 Co.	 v.	 Sawyer,	 343	 U.S.	 579,	 610	 (1952)	(Frankfurter,	 J.,	 concurring)	 (“It	 is	 an	 inadmissibly	 narrow	 conception	 of	 American	constitutional	law	to	confine	it	to	the	words	of	the	Constitution	and	to	disregard	the	gloss	which	life	has	written	upon	them”).	95 .	 Cf.	 Curtis	 A.	 Bradley	 &	 Neil	 S.	 Siegel,	After	 Recess:	 Historical	 Practice,	 Textual	
Ambiguity,	and	Constitutional	Adverse	Possession,	2014	SUP.	CT.	REV.	1,	51-65	(considering	an	“adverse	possession”	analogy	for	constitutional	meaning	under	which	certain	forms	of	long-settled	 constitutional	 practice	 might	 permissibly	 supersede	 an	 inconsistent	 rule	derived	from	constitutional	text).	
 
2020]	 "JUDICIAL	ROLE"	&	JUDICIAL	DUTY	 1259	that	courts	themselves	should	view	their	proper	“role”	in	foreign	affairs	as	a	 function	of	 their	more	 fundamental	duty	to	 interpret	and	apply	the	governing	law	in	cases	properly	brought	within	their	jurisdiction.96	But	such	a	constrained	view	of	judicial	role	may	not	necessarily	 be	 appropriate	 for	 all	 actors	 in	 our	 constitutional	system.	To	the	extent	that	the	particular	attributes	that	characterize	the	Article	III	 judiciary—including	legal	expertise,	independence,	insulation	from	political	pressures,	and	adversarial	presentation	of	evidence	 and	 arguments—render	 the	 courts	 particularly	appropriate	or	desirable	forums	for	addressing	questions	touching	on	foreign	relations,97	calls	for	a	more	significant	practical	role	for	the	 courts	 might	 plausibly	 be	 addressed	 to	 not	 only	 the	 courts	themselves	 but	 to	 other	 institutions,	 such	 as	 the	 President	 and	Congress.	These	other	 institutional	 actors,	 unlike	 the	 courts,	 are	not	 limited	 to	 interpreting	 and	 applying	 the	 preexisting	 law	 in	cases	 properly	 brought	 within	 their	 jurisdiction.	 Rather,	 these	other	institutions	have	an	explicit	and	acknowledged	policymaking	role	 in	 the	 constitutional	 framework	 and	 are	 thus	 much	 less	inhibited	 in	 their	 ability	 to	 explicitly	 weigh	 and	 act	 on	 purely	functionalist	considerations.98	And	 the	 President	 and	 Congress,	 in	 the	 exercise	 of	 their	respective	 constitutional	 powers, 99 	have	 a	 significant	 degree	 of	control	 over	 the	 substantive	 legal	 entitlements	 that	 might	 be	brought	before	the	courts,	thereby	shaping	to	a	meaningful	extent	the	practical	significance	of	 the	 judiciary’s	role	 in	 foreign	affairs.	
 96.	 See	supra	notes	8-13	and	accompanying	text.	97.	 See,	e.g.,	Aziz	Z.	Huq,	Structural	Constitutionalism	as	Counterterrorism,	100	CALIF.	L.	 REV.	 887,	 948–49	 (2012)	 (identifying	 features	 of	 Article	 III	 courts,	 such	 as	 the	adversarial	process	and	political	insulation,	that	might	make	them	valuable	participants	in	making	and	reviewing	decisions	concerning	counterterrorism	policy).	98.	 Cf.	Hollingsworth	v.	Perry,	570	U.S.	693,	700	(2013)	(explaining	that	an	important	function	of	the	case	or	controversy	limitation	is	to	“ensure[]	that	we	act	as	judges,	and	do	not	engage	in	policymaking	properly	left	to	elected	representatives.”)	(emphasis	omitted).	99.	 See	U.S.	 Const.	 art.	 I,	 §	8	 (empowering	 Congress	 to	 legislate	with	 respect	 to	 a	variety	of	enumerated	subjects	and	to	make	laws	“necessary	and	proper	for	carrying	into	execution”	its	own	powers	as	well	as	“all	other	powers	vested	.	.	.		in	the	Government	of	the	United	 States,	 or	 in	 any	 Department	 or	 Officer	 thereof”);	 U.S.	 Const.,	 art.	 II,	 §	2	(empowering	the	President,	by	and	with	 the	advice	and	consent	of	 the	Senate,	 to	make	Treaties);	 U.S.	 Const.,	 art.	 VI	 (declaring	 federal	 statutes	 and	 treaties,	 along	 with	 the	Constitution,	to	be	the	“supreme	Law	of	the	Land”).	
 
1260	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	Thus,	for	example,	if	the	political	branches	are	dissatisfied	with	the	practical	operation	of	the	presumption	against	extraterritoriality	(and	 the	consequent	 failure	of	 courts	 to	enforce	statutory	 rights	abroad),	Congress	can	override	the	presumption—either	globally	or	within	the	context	of	specific	statutes.100	Likewise,	 if	Congress	and	 the	 President	 grow	 dissatisfied	with	 the	 judiciary’s	 present	inability	 to	enforce	 the	nation’s	commitments	under	multilateral	treaties,	they	have	the	capacity	to	alter	this	state	of	affairs	by	either	renegotiating	the	underlying	treaties	to	remove	obstacles	to	self-execution	or	 (more	 likely)	 by	 adopting	 implementing	 legislation	conferring	 explicit	 rights	 under	 domestic	 law	 that	 match	 the	nation’s	international	treaty	commitments.101	And	 while	 it	 seems	 deeply	 improbable	 that	 policymakers	would	 have	 either	 the	 incentive	 or	 capacity	 to	 restore	 prize	jurisdiction	 to	 its	 once	 central	 role	 in	 the	 transnational	 legal	system,	the	success	of	prize	courts	in	providing	a	relatively	stable	system	of	international	governance	implemented	through	national	courts	 might	 plausibly	 provide	 a	 model	 for	 future	 directions	 in	international	 law. 102 	Efforts	 along	 these	 lines	 may	 already	 be	emerging	at	 the	 international	 level.103	To	 the	extent	 the	political	branches	 are	 interested	 in	 integrating	 the	 federal	 judiciary	 into	this	 emerging	 framework	of	 international	 governance,	 they	may	have	a	significant	capacity	to	empower	the	courts	in	this	way.	
CONCLUSION	We	 are	 all,	 of	 course,	 familiar	 with	 Chief	 Justice	Marshall’s	famous	declaration	that	“[i]t	is	emphatically	the	province	and	duty	of	 the	 judicial	 department	 to	 say	what	 the	 law	 is.”104	Less	 often	
 100.	 See	supra	note	87.	101.	 See,	e.g.,	Torture	Victim	Protection	Act	of	1991	(TVPA),	Pub.	L.	No.	102–256,	106	Stat.	73	(March	12,	1992)	(establishing	a	private	right	of	action	for	victims	of	torture	or	extrajudicial	killing	in	order	“to	carry	out	obligations	of	the	United	States	under	the	United	Nations	Charter	and	other	international	agreements	pertaining	to	the	protection	of	human	rights”).	102.	 See	Bederman,	supra	note	15,	at	64	(“The	enduring	significance	of	prize	law	lies	not	so	much	in	informing	our	opinions	of	admiralty	or	constitutional	doctrine	(which	it	surely	does),	 but,	 rather,	 as	 a	paradigm	 for	 the	 incremental	development	of	 customary	international	law.”).	103.	 See,	e.g.,	FLAHERTY,	supra	note	3,	at	147-48	(discussing	the	emergence	in	recent	years	 of	 a	 global	 legal	 system	 composed	 of	 “formal	 and	 informal	 transnational	 judicial	networks”).	104.	 Marbury	v.	Madison,	5	U.S.	(1	Cranch)	137,	177	(1803).	
2020]	 "JUDICIAL	ROLE"	&	JUDICIAL	DUTY	 1261	appreciated	is	that	the	practical	significance	of	this	duty	will	often	depend	on	what	that	“law”	actually	is.	A	consequence	of	this	way	of	thinking	about	the	judiciary’s	proper	“role”	in	foreign	affairs	is	that	the	 judiciary’s	 role	 might	 plausibly	 change	 over	 time	 due	 to	changes	 in	background	principles	of	 governing	 law.	 It	 is	 at	 least	conceivable	 that	 the	 content	 of	 the	 underlying	 law	 has,	 in	 fact,	changed	in	ways	that	render	the	judiciary’s	role	in	modern	foreign	affairs	 controversies	 less	 significant	 than	 it	 may	 have	 been	 in	earlier	 eras.	 But	 even	 accepting	 this	 possibility,	 there	 is	 every	reason	to	expect	that	background	legal	principles	will	continue	to	change	and	evolve	in	new	ways.		And	some	of	those	changes	may	have	the	tendency	to	magnify,	rather	than	diminish,	the	judiciary’s	role	in	foreign	affairs.	Professor	Flaherty	has	given	us	a	great	deal	to	think	about	as	we	look	back	over	the	changes	that	have	already	taken	place,	and	ahead	at	the	changes	that	are	yet	to	come.																								
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